Starting a Safety Management System Culture in Small Flight School Organizations by Woo, Gregory S.
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace 
Education & Research 
Volume 24 
Number 3 JAAER Spring 2015 Article 1 
Spring 2015 
Starting a Safety Management System Culture in Small Flight 
School Organizations 
Gregory S. Woo 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University - PhD Candidate, College of Aviation, gwoo@ieee.org 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Woo, G. S. (2015). Starting a Safety Management System Culture in Small Flight School Organizations. 
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, 24(3). https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2015.1631 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
 Introduction 
A strong safety-oriented culture is a key requirement for the implementation of a Safety 
Management System (SMS) (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).  Therefore, developing and 
maintaining a strong safety culture is a critical prerequisite for small flight school organizations 
considering the implementation of an SMS.  This case study describes how one small flight 
school used collaboration and employee engagement to strengthen its safety culture and generate 
support for the implementation of an SMS.  
SMS concepts, practices, tools, and policies represent the future for safety management 
in the aviation industry according to Stolzer, Halford, and Goglia (2008).  The definition of an 
SMS is “a dynamic risk management system based on quality management system (QMS) 
principles in a structure scaled appropriately to the operational risk, applied in a safety culture 
environment” (Stolzer et al., 2008, p. 18-19).  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have both developed programs designed to 
educate service providers on the need for SMS, as well as strategies for implementing SMS, 
because they believe that the SMS concept is important for continued improvement of safety in 
the face of increasing aviation system complexity and advancing technology (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2015; International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009). 
Given that these important organizations believe SMS is an important component of the 
aviation industry of the future, it is critical for future pilots to be knowledgeable regarding their 
roles in SMS processes.  Therefore, it is important, even for small flights schools, to embrace and 
teach SMS concepts to student pilots because what students learn and experience first, will have 
a strong and lasting influence on them throughout their flying years (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2008).   
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How prepared are smaller flight schools to take on the task of an SMS implementation?  
Even more perplexing is how does a small flight school get started if they don’t have a well-
defined, policy and documentation-backed safety culture?  Stolzer et al. (2008) stress that a 
strong safety culture is a requirement for the implementation of an effective SMS and ensuring 
the existence of this safety culture is one of the first steps an organization must take when 
implementing an SMS. 
This emphasis on culture is important because the culture of an organization reflects its 
shared beliefs, values, and norms; and an organization’s culture influences the way in which its 
people behave (Stolzer et al., 2008).  Therefore, it makes sense to ensure the establishment of a 
strong safety-oriented culture as one of the key early steps towards implementing an SMS. 
The thesis of this article is that identifying a common set of values and goals, along with 
a shared sense of purpose regarding the need for a safety culture, can be an effective strategy for 
small flight school organizations to overcome resistance to changes needed to transform or 
develop a safety culture.  The proposed method for achieving this is to engage everyone in the 
organization, in a collaborative effort to define the values, purpose, methods, and behavioral 
norms needed to meet the safety goals established by the group.  The concept of engaging staff at 
all levels of the organization, early in the effort to establish new cultural norms, is supported by 
multiple studies (Wilson-Donnelly, Priest, Burke, & Salas, 2004; Williamsen, 2007; 
Hajmohammad & Vachon, 2014; FAA, 2015).  A secondary component of this thesis is that 
flight school staff and pilots have an underlying desire to contribute and to participate as 
members of a safety-oriented organization, despite the common management concern regarding 
organizational resistance to cultural change (Thomas & Hardy, 2011). 
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To see if this specific thesis and the existing literature on safety culture development 
might apply well to a small flight school operation, a case study at a flight school was developed.  
Initial opinion data was gathered through a blind survey instrument.  Collaborative discussion 
and planning sessions were subsequently conducted in order to gather feedback from staff. 
The findings are compared to expectations derived from existing literature on cultural 
change, safety management, learning, and motivation to validate the paper’s thesis.  The findings 
also lead to potential strategies for strengthening the safety culture at smaller-sized flight 
schools. 
Literature Review 
FAA Aviation Circular AC 120-92B describes an SMS as a system “that helps you make 
better safety management decisions” (FAA, 2015, p. 5).  An effective SMS is built upon four 
fundamental structures: “policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety 
promotion” (Stolzer et al., 2008, p. 25) designed to promote the active involvement of the 
organization’s leaders in safety management; nurture open, safety-related communications both 
vertically and horizontally throughout the organization; and ensure that everyone in the 
organization embraces safety as a critical component of their job responsibilities (FAA, 2015).   
An organization’s top management must document the policies defining and describing 
how safety will be achieved.  Management must also define the role each member of the 
organization holds and how each individual is accountable for fulfilling their role.  The 
accountability policy must include the organization’s top leadership and their role in ensuring 
safety and adherence to SMS policies (Stolzer et al., 2008, p. 25). 
The second SMS component, a risk management system, identifies, analyzes, assesses, 
controls, and manages safety risks to ensure they are appropriately addressed.  Such a system 
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must ensure that risks to safety are vigilantly detected and acted upon in a timely manner (Stolzer 
et al., 2008). 
The third SMS component, a safety assurance system, provides proactive monitoring and 
systemic improvement for the SMS through the use of quality assurance tools and methods to 
ensure the SMS objectives are achieved.  The safety assurance system must measure, track, and 
assess the performance of the SMS in order to ensure that the system is effective.  Audits, 
management review of safety issue resolution activities, and internal analysis and evaluation of 
safety policies and procedures all help to ensure the effectiveness of the SMS (Stolzer et al., 
2008). 
The fourth component of an SMS, safety promotion, ensures that everyone in the 
organization understands their safety responsibilities and knows how to carry out those 
responsibilities (Stolzer et al., 2008).  Employees, managers, and top leaders must all know the 
organization’s safety policies and how to use their associated reporting procedures, risk 
management tools, and communications mechanisms.  Most importantly, all of the members of 
the organization must be trained to carry out their duties in a manner consistent with the 
organization’s safety policies and procedures (Stolzer et al., 2008). 
The thesis for this article is that there must be a strong, organization-wide safety culture 
in order to implement and sustain a successful, effective safety management system because such 
a system requires all of the organization’s members to be active participants who share common 
goals and accountability for a successful outcome (Stolzer et al., 2008).  Safety Management 
Systems in Aviation describes the importance of cultural considerations in the implementation of 
an SMS and offers a variety of methods for leading efforts to change an organization’s culture 
(Stolzer et al., 2008).  If an organization’s leaders want to establish SMS, they must understand 
4
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 24, No. 3 [2015], Art. 1
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol24/iss3/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2015.1631
how to develop and implement a safety culture because of “the inextricable tie between a strong 
safety culture and successful implementation of SMS” (Stolzer et al., 2008, p. 25).  Culture is a 
crucial component of any safety management initiative because culture influences people’s 
perceptions of what is important, where the power lies within the organization, and what the 
expectations are for success (Blair, 2003).  “Organizational culture can help or harm safety 
efforts.  An organization’s culture is more powerful than any individual” (Blair, 2003, p. 18). 
Edgar Schein (2010) argues that culture “helps to explain some of the more seemingly 
incomprehensible and irrational aspects of what goes on in groups, occupations, organizations, 
and other kinds of social units that have common histories” (p. 21).  He further clarifies the 
importance of culture, when it comes to individual behaviors, by explaining that culture “defines 
for us what to pay attention to, what things mean, how to react emotionally, to what is going on, 
and what actions to take in various kinds of situations” (Schein, 2010, p. 29).  In other words, 
culture has a strong degree of influence on how people behave, interact with each other, and 
make decisions. 
There is strong, consistent support for the importance of cultural factors and the existence 
of a strong safety culture when it comes to accident prevention, safety risk management, and 
safety management systems as evidenced by the number of works on topics related to this theme 
(Lund & Aaro, 2004; Antonsen, 2009; Luria & Rafaeli, 2008; Stolzer et al., 2008).  If changing 
or evolving the culture to be more safety-oriented is a priority, then it makes sense to understand 
how to approach the creation of a cultural change.  Antonsen (2009) describes how culture can 
be interpreted as being “both a product and a process” (p. 188).  In other words, while culture 
can shape or influence individual and organizational behavior, it is also the product of the 
interaction between the members of the group that embodies it (Antonsen, 2009).  This suggests 
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that through the use of appropriate group work, cultures can be redefined, changed, or developed.  
Furthermore, Edmondson (2002) found that team-based group learning, in an environment that 
was psychologically safe and interactive, fostered progress on organizational goals.  In summary, 
“culture change will not occur without the involvement, commitment, and active support of 
organization members throughout the entire organization” (Cameron & Quinn, 2006, p.103).  
Cameron and Quinn (2006) emphasize that too often, organizations that attempt to improve in 
some manner, fail to take the time and make the effort to develop a common viewpoint among 
employees about where the organization currently stands, and what it needs to achieve in the 
future. 
In addition to the establishment of a strong safety-oriented culture, senior management’s 
commitment to SMS-related programs is essential.  Management must learn the comprehensive 
costs and benefits associated with both accidents and safety programs.  Management must also 
understand their role in encouraging safety as a valued component of the organizational culture 
(Friend & Pagliari, 2000). 
Kotter (1996) provides a comprehensive approach to leading and managing 
organizational change that sets the stage for developing this common viewpoint.  Key points in 
Kotter’s model include establishing a sense of urgency regarding the need for change, creating a 
guiding coalition, developing a vision and a strategy for change, and empowering employees for 
broad-based action (Kotter, 2008; Kotter, 1996).   
The creation of a sense of urgency is an important starting point for leading a cultural 
change.  Kotter emphasizes that “a true sense of urgency is rare … [and] it has to be created and 
re-created” (Kotter, 2008, p.15).  Kotter expands on this point by describing his observations of 
how challenging it is for organizations to sustain change initiatives because the urgency tends to 
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wane over time – especially if they have experienced a few successes with their initial efforts 
(Kotter, 2008).  The implication is that the small flight school organization must find methods to 
keep the staff engaged in growing the safety culture because the energy that currently exists 
within the organization, to address safety improvement opportunities, will likely dissipate over 
time unless efforts are made to renew the sense of urgency. 
The drive for this continually renewed sense of urgency comes from leadership exhibited 
not only at the top, but throughout the organization (Kotter, 1996).  While senior level 
management will have to define the cultural tone by exhibiting both leadership and commitment 
to the establishment of a safety culture (Stolzer et al., 2008), Kotter (1996) suggests that top level 
management must also find ways to create leaders with shared vision at all levels of the 
organization to continually renew the sense of urgency around the organization’s change 
initiatives.  Kotter states that “the primary function of leadership is to produce change, and if a 
culture encourages that activity throughout the hierarchy, it will produce a great deal of risk 
taking, initiative, communication, and motivation” (Kotter and Heskett, 1992, p. 45). 
Enabling leaders at all levels of the organization can result in inspiring everyone to 
collaborate and lead.  This type of organizational interaction has many parallels to the idea of a 
self-directed team.  The concept of a self-directed, cultural evolution initiative is further 
supported by Margaret Wheatley’s work on self-directed organizational change in which she 
finds that “if the work of change is at the level of an entire organization or community, then the 
search for new meaning must be done as a collective inquiry” (Wheatley, 2006, p. 148).  
Wheatley maintains the concept of finding a new meaning is important because people need to 
have the opportunity “to explore an issue sufficiently to decide whether new meaning is available 
and desirable” (p. 148) before they can embrace change.   
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Ballesteros (2007), Reason (2008), and Argyris & Schön (1996) also talk about the 
importance and relevance of organizational learning in the context of implementing and guiding 
cultural change.  This is relevant because in their descriptions of the organizational change 
dynamics, the pool of change agents is not confined to a few selected leaders.  This is consistent 
with Wheatley’s call for engaging the organization.  Winterberger (2010) also emphasizes the 
importance of engaging expertise from all parts of the organization for input on the analysis and 
implementation of safety.  In the small flight school environment, this emphasis translates to the 
need to engage everyone. 
Simon and Cistaro (2009), also cite the importance of engaging employees during efforts 
to transform a safety culture.  It helps to create transformational leaders and champions at all 
levels of the organization consistent with Kotter’s (1996) approach to leading change.  Similarly, 
Hajmohammad and Vachon (2014) described the importance of building individual commitment 
through empowerment and participation to establish a safety-oriented culture.  It is an additional 
perspective highlighting the relevance of collaboration across the entire organization. 
Collaborative development of new meaning and organizational learning can integrate 
opposing viewpoints on the development of a strong, organizational culture as described by 
Reason (1997) in his chapter on engineering a safety culture.  Reason summarized the various 
approaches to changing an organization’s safety culture to being either a management-driven 
change to an organization’s practices, or a collective shift in the integrated individual and group 
values, beliefs, and behaviors.  Though Reason favors the management-driven approach to 
cultural change, it seems possible that combining the two approaches, by engaging staff at all 
levels of the organization as change leaders and managers, would achieve both objectives of 
Reason’s approaches and improve the effectiveness of the change.  The entire staff would 
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potentially have insight, ownership, and clarity regarding the change and the need for the change.  
Such a process would result in organizational learning and better acceptance of any procedural 
change by energizing the staff around the new meanings they have collaboratively developed 
(Wheatley, 2006).   
The collaboration process would also facilitate the development of three basic conditions 
for the growth of a safety culture: trust, commitment, and understanding of the flight school’s 
non-punitive safety management initiative (McCune, Lewis, & Arendt, 2011).  The 
establishment of these basic conditions would further enable the staff to accept safety-related 
changes at the flight school. 
Before the concept of organizational learning is accepted as the best or only path forward 
for achieving organizational culture change, it should be noted that Argyris & Schön caution that 
organizational learning can produce unintended results such as destructive learning (Argyris & 
Schön, 1996).  Careful preparation and monitoring must be incorporated into the process of 
leading organizational learning to prevent such an outcome from occurring. 
Methodology 
The existing literature consistently describes how a well-developed safety culture is a 
prerequisite for the successful implementation of an SMS within a given organization.  The 
literature also reviews key concepts regarding methods and requirements for the development of 
a safety-oriented culture.  In order to test the applicability of concepts found in the research, a 
small flight school was selected to conduct a case study. 
A 14-question blind survey, distributed to everyone in the company, including the 
company owners, solicited information on their beliefs and perspectives of safety at the flight 
school.  The survey attempted to identify potential sources of resistance and potential sources of 
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motivation for moving forward with change initiatives to strengthen the flight school’s safety 
culture.  According to Williamsen (2007), Dan Petersen, a well-known safety expert and thought 
leader, recommends the use of a survey as an excellent method for gaining insight into the safety 
culture perceptions, beliefs, and opinions of people at all levels of an organization.  After the 
survey collected initial information from the staff, follow up meetings were held to engage 
employees in collaborative working sessions to define how to move forward with the further 
development of the safety culture.   
The survey results were reviewed with the staff members at meetings for the purposes of 
validating the aggregate data and determining the level of support regarding the outcomes.  The 
staff meetings were initiated with strict ground rules that were enforced to preclude judgmental 
commentary.  People were encouraged to explore all sides of any questions or issues that 
emerged with a promise from the senior management team that no performance or attitude 
judgments would be made.  The survey outcomes were also discussed with small groups of staff 
in casual, private follow up meetings, where no management was present, to see if different 
concerns or perspectives would emerge.  It was anticipated that this combination of interactions 
would work because of the trust and integrity the researcher has established with the staff 
through previous polling efforts.   
The resulting conversations were energetic and productive resulting in a consensus to 
move forward with further brainstorming and planning around the implementation of an SMS.  
Once an initial plan of action was produced, follow up individual interviews were conducted 
with every employee, from top management on down, to identify barriers and concerns about 
future efforts to strengthen the school’s safety culture and improve its safety management 
practices. 
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Case Study Background  
The flight school used for this case study operates a fleet of 14 aircraft and has a staff 
consisting of 12 flight instructors, two dispatchers, two managers, and two administrative staff.  
This flight school also serves as the flight training operation for a local college’s professional 
aviation program. 
The drive to implement an SMS for this small flight school stems from external pressure 
by the local college.  The aviation department at this college has mandated the implementation of 
an SMS for consistency and alignment with its curriculum. 
The flight school’s management team, which includes the owner, is willing to implement 
an SMS to satisfy the college’s demands; however, some of the flight school’s staff felt the need 
to adopt additional safety-oriented practices, especially those associated with a formal SMS 
process, was not urgent.  Their concern stemmed from assumptions made with respect to the 
potential for extra documented work and excessively rigorous operating practices.  They 
believed that excessive rigor could impose unreasonable constraints and unnecessary inefficiency 
on the training process.  These concerns were based on assumptions formed during staff 
discussions on safety practices and procedures the company had considered as a means to fulfill 
the college’s SMS requirement.  Therefore, defining a strategy to address these resistance-
generating concerns was an important first step. 
The rationale for focusing on the development of a safety management culture for this 
small organization is derived from the definition of an SMS.  Stolzer et al. (2008) emphasize that 
successful implementation of an SMS is tied to the organization’s commitment to operating with 
a strong safety-oriented culture.  The existence of an established safety-oriented culture is 
characterized by a shared, clearly-defined, and consistent set of values, operating practices, and 
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behavioral norms oriented towards safety (Stolzer et al., 2008).  This suggests that attempting to 
implement an SMS is likely to result in failure if the organization does not have well-defined, 
shared values, beliefs, and behavioral norms regarding safety management. 
Implementing cultural change at this flight school is entirely realistic given its size and 
nature.  It is a small family-owned and operated business.  The instructors, who generally are not 
family members, have bonded well with both the management team and with each other.  They 
have also repeatedly expressed commitment to making the flight school a premium quality flight 
training organization.  
A few years ago, a highly regarded member of the flight school’s community perished in 
a tragic accident.  This traumatic loss united the staff and triggered the review and discussion of 
the flight school’s safety practices.  While a number of concepts and proposals were discussed, 
only a few have been implemented.  Informal staff interviews suggest there is an interest in 
instituting a more formal and systematic approach to safety, but there is also a mixed sense of 
urgency regarding any large-scale immediate actions.  Those who expressed concern about 
implementing a more systematic approach to safety tend to feel such highly structured safety 
programs are most appropriate and feasible for larger air carrier operations.  Additionally, most 
of the staff believes the flight school already has a strong, practical, safety-oriented culture.  
Understanding and working through these obstacles to cultural change is a key requirement for 
successful, further development of the flight school’s safety culture. 
Survey Results 
The survey was completed by 33 respondents.  The entire staff of 18 at the flight school 
completed the survey.  Fifteen of the respondents were flight school students or rental customers.  
Since little correlation and no significant patterns of data were found among the non-staff 
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respondents, the data analysis was focused on the staff responses.  Ultimately, the safety culture 
will be defined by the flight school’s community-wide beliefs and behaviors; however, the flight 
school staff must establish themselves as a unified body of leaders and champions for safety first. 
The survey results, in combination with staff discussions and qualitative data gathered 
from follow-up staff interviews, suggest the staff at the flight school can potentially be inspired 
and motivated to further develop a safety-oriented culture.  Though the initial data gathered by 
the survey suggests there may be some resistance to changing the current culture, qualitative data 
gathered from individual staff interviews near the end of the study revealed subsequent 
commitment by all employees to improving safety and safety management practices. 
In general, the staff believes safety is a core value for the organization and learning more 
about professional safety management practices will be beneficial to their aviation careers as 
shown in Table 1 and Table 2 below.  The two neutral responses in Table 2 were submitted by 
flight instructors.  Neither of these two flight instructors were high total time [greater than 3,000 
hours’ experience] pilots.  The management team members are all high-time pilots; therefore, the 




The Number of Staff Who Believe Safety is a Core Value at this Flight School 
 
 Frequency  Percent 
 Strongly disagree 1     5.5 
Disagree 0     0.0 
Neutral 0     0.0 
Agree 7   38.9 
Strongly agree 10   55.6 
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Table 2 
 
The Number of Staff Who Believe Learning More About Safety is Relevant to Their Career 
 
 Frequency  Percent 
  
Strongly disagree 0    0.0 
Disagree 0    0.0 
Neutral 2  11.1 
Agree 8  44.4 
Strongly agree 7  38.9 
Missing 1              5.6 
 
Total 18          100.0 
 
Table 3 shows there are staff members who do not believe additional safety management 
discipline and follow-through are needed.  Five staff members, who are flight instructors, 
disagree or strongly disagree with the need for more safety discipline at the flight school.  Table 
4 shows these five staff members also believe the flight school already has a culture in which 




The Number of Staff Who Believe More Safety Discipline is Needed 
 
 Frequency  Percent 
 Strongly disagree 1    5.5 
Disagree 4  22.2 
Neutral 7  38.9 
Agree 3  16.7 
Strongly agree 3  16.7 









Breakdown of Staff Who Responded “No Additional Safety Discipline is Needed” and Their 
Beliefs Regarding “Safety is Consistently Practiced and Reinforced as Part of the Culture” 
 
 Frequency  Percent 
 Agree 2  40.0 
Strongly agree 3  60.0 
Total 5          100.0 
 
However, Table 5 shows that the majority of the staff agree that it makes sense to 
implement additional safety management practices, even if it results in new reporting and 
recordkeeping procedures.  This suggests that there are no substantial staff barriers to the concept 




The Number of Staff Who Believe Implementing Additional Safety Management Procedures 
Makes Sense 
 
 Frequency  Percent 
 Strongly disagree 0    0.0 
Disagree 0        0.0 
Neutral 3  16.7 
Agree 9  50.0 
Strongly agree 6  33.3 
Total 18          100.0 
 
While the majority of the staff is willing to consider new safety management practices, 
Table 6 suggests the staff have varied views on the level of trust in the company when it comes 
to protecting the identity of people who submit reports on safety hazards, errors, and issues.  
Table 7 depicts the staff’s varied opinions regarding the openness of other people in the flight 
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The Number of Staff Who Trust the Company to Protect Their Identity as a Safety Report 
Submitter 
 
 Frequency  Percent 
 Strongly disagree 0    0.0 
Disagree 0    0.0 
Neutral 4  22.2 
Agree 6  33.3 
Strongly agree 8  44.4 





The Number of Staff Who Believe Implementing a Formal Safety Management Program Will Be 
Difficult Because People Will Be Reluctant to Participate 
 
 Frequency  Percent 
 Strongly disagree 1    5.6 
Disagree 7  38.9 
Neutral 6  33.3 
Agree 4  22.2 
Strongly agree 0    0.0 
Total 18          100.0 
 
Despite the concerns expressed by some of the staff about the willingness of other people 
to participate in voluntary safety issue reporting and safety management procedures, Table 8 
reveals that none of the staff indicated they would refuse to submit safety reports to the 
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company.  Over 66% of the staff said they would participate actively in a voluntary safety hazard 




The Number of Staff Who Indicated They Would Contribute Safety Reports Themselves 
 
 Frequency  Percent 
 
Strongly disagree 0    0.0 
Disagree 0    0.0 
Neutral 6  33.3 
Agree 3  16.7 
Strongly agree 9  50.0 
Total 18          100.0 
 
Finally, while the small sample size of 18 responses makes it difficult to generalize these 
findings outside of this case study, it appears as if there is some correlation between the years of 
experience as a pilot and a staff member’s belief in the need for additional safety discipline at the 
flight school.  Figure 1 suggests that some of the newer staff pilots believe that the current level 
of safety discipline is already adequate.  Also, the staff with the strongest belief in the need for 
more safety discipline had the most years of experience as a pilot.   
Examination of the relationship between hours of flight experience and beliefs regarding 
safety revealed no discernable correlation.  Perhaps this is related to the general aviation 
environment; however, no data are available to explain the difference between years of 
experience and hours of flight time when it comes to their relationship to the beliefs above.  
These observations are tempered by the lack of a strong, significant correlation between years of 
piloting experience and the belief that more discipline is needed.  The Pearson R is 0.425 and it 
was not significant at the 0.05 level.   
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1=Strongly Disagree,  2=Disagree,  3=Neutral,  4=Agree,  5=Strongly Agree 
 
Pilot Years:  1= 0-1 year,  2= 1-3 years,  3= 3-5 years,  4= 5-10 years,  5= more than 10 years 
 
Figure 1.  Scatter plot of responses to the survey question asking if more safety discipline and 
follow-through is needed at this flight school.  The linear projection is based on a simple linear 
regression of the scatter plots.  The numbers in the rectangular boxes represent each actual data 
point.  Multiple boxes with the same number surrounding a circular point means that multiple 
responses were recorded for that combination of pilot years and response value. 
 
Discussion 
The literature on driving change in the culture of an organization emphasizes the 
importance of leadership and inspiring a sense of urgency.  It also emphasizes the importance of 
stimulating leadership at all levels of the organization.  In small organizations, the implication is 
the use of collaborative workgroups, that engage everyone, may produce the most energy and 
commitment to generating the organizational changes needed to grow the safety culture.  In a 
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small organization, engaging everyone is relatively easy to do.  It is much more difficult to 
achieve that in a large organization. 
In the small flight school organizational environment, the entire staff has clear visibility 
regarding the attitudes and behaviors exhibited by each other.  As more and more of the staff 
adopt certain specific behaviors, new social norms will emerge and these will often be more 
influential than any single person’s attitude or behavior (Lund & Aaro, 2004).  This is critical 
since the existence of a strong safety culture is a prerequisite for the implementation of a safety 
management system (Stolzer et al., 2008). 
The data collected in the case study survey suggest some resistance to the introduction of 
more formal safety management discipline may have existed at the time of the survey.  Table 3 
shows more than half the staff members have neutral or negative opinions about the need to 
implement more safety discipline.  Only six staff members feel more safety discipline is clearly 
needed.  Collective inquiry, in the form of a collaborative effort to define future safety strategies, 
should be considered as an approach for understanding the true meaning of this result (Wheatley, 
2006).  Though seven staff members were neutral on the need for more safety management 
discipline, their lack of a sense of need suggests they may be content with the status quo.  This 
may indicate complacency in which opportunities for improvement are recognized, but actions to 
implement changes are deferred indefinitely (Kotter, 2008).  In fact, the flight school had been 
discussing and deferring the implementation of SMS and of other culture-altering initiatives for 
some time.  Kotter (2008) states that “a real sense of urgency is rare, much rarer than most 
people seem to think” (p. 9) and he maintains that a sense of urgency is needed to drive out 
complacency so change and culture development can proactively occur. 
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Five staff members did not agree additional safety management reporting and/or new 
safety management practices are needed per the initial survey.  These may or may not be 
individuals who were reluctant to take on additional safety management tasks.  It is interesting to 
note that all of the flight school’s employees, including these five flight instructors, believe the 
flight school does a good job promoting and driving safety already.  These staff may have felt 
that the flight school’s current safety practices were good enough and more discipline was not 
required at the time they answered the survey. 
By the end of the study period, 100% of the staff agreed to support and participate in the 
identification and development of improved safety management processes and tools during one-
on-one interviews.  Some stated their initial apprehension was relieved once they understood 
they would have the opportunity to help shape and define any new policies and procedures.  
Therefore, no obvious barriers, within the flight school’s organization, are standing in the way of 
efforts to start building a stronger safety-oriented culture.  The same is true for the 
implementation of a safety management system based on the final qualitative inputs gathered 
from individual interviews at the end of the study – as long as everyone had an opportunity to 
participate in the development of the new strategies, procedures, and expectations.  The 
weakness of this conclusion is the possibility that individual responses were different from those 
collected by the survey because of the in-person nature of how the final attitudes were collected.  
Informal post-study observations appear to support the more positive result of employee 
willingness to engage in the cultural change process. 
There was some skepticism and concern within the organization regarding the work 
required to implement such a system and there were some trust concerns regarding how the data 
would be used.  Therefore, the approach for implementing an SMS in this small flight school 
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organization must be designed carefully.  However, the qualitative input sections of the survey 
collected a variety of ideas for refining the safety management policies, assuring the continuous 
improvement of safety practices, and promoting safety through seminars, messaging, and 
emphasis of safety considerations.  Most significantly, by the end of the study, all employees 
expressed a desire to help evolve the school’s safety culture and practices. 
It is possible that some of the concern about the imposition of new work and process 
demands may have been the result of a perception that the SMS had been mandated upon the 
company without good reason.  Some of the freeform text comments that accompanied the 
questionnaire responses imply this.  This is an important consideration for organizations working 
to change their safety culture.  Engaging everyone in a small organization, in the collaborative 
learning and development process, can potentially ward off concerns that might otherwise 
develop if the same ideas are externally imposed on them.  The literature on creating effective 
change in an organization’s culture suggests that a participative and collaborative approach to 
identifying a common set of goals, perspectives, and strategies for achieving a stronger safety-
oriented culture could work well in smaller organizations such as the one described in the case 
study. 
In a smaller-sized organization, such as the flight school in this case study, large portions, 
if not all of the staff can potentially participate in the culture change tasks.  The sense of urgency 
for the case study flight school was established by the combination of a tragic accident and the 
demand from the local college that an SMS be implemented soon.  That sense of urgency now 
needs to be cultivated and renewed so that it is sustained and is meaningful to future staff who 
may question the need for an increased level of safety discipline.  This essentially means 
imbedding the sense of urgency into the culture (Kotter, 2008).  The other components of 
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Kotter’s change methodology can be adapted to leading the cultural change initiative in an 
inclusive and collaborative way that creates both buy-in and common understanding regarding 
the changes developed by the collective organization. 
Creating change in this kind of collective and collaborative manner will ensure that 
everyone in the flight school is at least aware of the key guiding values, priority goals, and 
standard approaches and methods for achieving the school’s safety goals because everyone will 
have contributed to the definition of the goals and methods.  Such an approach will also generate 
opportunities for both individual learning and organizational learning.  The opportunity for 
learning about safety practices and SMS concepts can be an incentive for participating in the 
process in a small flight school environment.  Many flight instructors, in such an environment, 
have career aspirations that will be well-served by knowledge of SMS concepts and SMS 
implementation challenges.  In the case study, there was clearly an interest on the part of the 
flight instructors to learn more about safety practices and SMS concepts. 
These ideas align well with the observation that an organization that has an effective 
SMS in place will also display the characteristics associated with having a learning culture 
(Stolzer et al., 2008).  Continuous learning, improvement, and collaborative efforts to identify, 
analyze, and manage risk are all fundamental components of both an SMS and a safety culture. 
To test whether or not the literature-based position on collaborative, learning-oriented 
approaches to developing a safety-oriented culture may be applicable in the small flight school 
environment, follow up discussions were held with small groups of the staff as well as with 
individual staff members.  The results of these conversations were consistent and unanimous 
regarding the interest, enthusiasm, and importance of engaging all of the staff in collaborative 
workshop-like sessions to provide both learning opportunities and culture-defining opportunities 
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regarding safety and SMS implementation activities.  By the end of this case study, everyone 
from the top level management ranks to the most junior staff members expressed interest in 
being part of the process and contributing to improved safety management.  This is remarkable 
given the fact that some degree of concern was expressed in the survey results and given that 
100% of the staff believed the flight school already had a safety-oriented culture. 
Conclusions 
The key conclusions of this study are that small flight school organizations may well 
have the opportunities to effectively develop a stronger safety-oriented culture and to implement 
an SMS that is structured in manner appropriately scaled to their operational risks.  Based on the 
case study conducted for this article, the use of a survey instrument, and frank, open-group 
discussions, to determine the potential barriers and obstacles to undertaking such an effort will 
be helpful for engaging the staff. 
The literature emphasizes the importance of a strong and consistent management 
commitment to establishing both a safety-oriented culture for the organization and a safe climate 
for the staff to define, collaboratively develop, and learn about the new standards, processes, and 
practices that form the new culture (Wilson-Donnelly et al., 2004).  Also, ensuring the existence 
of a strong safety culture is a critical early step in the process of implementing an SMS. 
The literature-defined approaches appear to be effective within the context of the case 
study used for this article.  The use of widespread engagement and empowerment of the entire 
staff to develop its safety culture seems to have mitigated early concerns expressed in the survey 
results.  Additionally, it appears as if everyone employed at the flight school is genuinely 
interested in contributing to the ongoing improvement of safety at the school.  The case study 
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flight school now has an engaged staff that is eager to move forward with the organizational 
learning and collaborative SMS development effort. 
Recommendations 
The findings of this article and the use of the case study as a means of applying the 
existing research provided promising results.  It is recommended that a broader study be 
conducted to determine how well these findings can be generalized in the small flight school 
environment. 
Separately, it is also recommended that flight schools choosing to undertake an initiative 
to strengthen their safety culture and to implement an SMS, heed Kotter’s advice regarding the 
need to create a sense of urgency around why such an initiative makes sense.  The flight school 
in the case study experienced varying levels of proactive effort over the past two years in terms 
of executing on this initiative.  Kotter reminds us that “a true sense of urgency is rare … [and] it 
has to be created and re-created” (Kotter, 2008, p.15).  It will not sustain its intensity on its own.  
Therefore, the management and the culture must continually work to renew it. 
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Please place an X in one answer box for each of the following questions.  An optional 
comment area is included for each question if you feel you need to clarify your response.  It is 




1. Safety is a core value that is presently taught and emphasized here. 





2. Safety is consistently practiced and reinforced as part of our culture here. 





3. More safety management, discipline, and follow through are needed here. 












4. I would be an active contributor of safety hazard and error observations if we had a 
trustworthy, anonymous safety report submission system. 





5. Learning more about professional safety management practices and operating procedures 
would benefit my aviation career interests. 
 
 (Leave blank if you have no professional career interests in aviation) 





6. Implementing additional safety management practices, designed to uncover safety hazards 
that are not currently being addressed, makes sense – even if it requires new reporting and 
record keeping procedures. 
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7. I would be more likely to participate in a safety issue reporting program if I were given the 
opportunity to help define and shape that program. 





8. I trust the company to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of the safety hazards, 
errors, and issues I’ve observed and submitted to the safety management program for 
analysis and improvement action. 





9. Implementing a stronger safety culture and a formal safety management program will be 
difficult here because people won’t admit to procedural errors or spend the time to submit 
safety issue observations reports – even if the system protects their anonymity. 























10. List the top one to three ideas you have for encouraging the management, staff, and pilots to 
consistently support safe flying. 
I would like to 
participate in 
setting this up 
Describe your idea(s) below 
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A. Describe your role or position here:  (check all that apply) 
□  Student   □  Rental Customer     □  Flight School Staff □  Other (describe below) 
Comments: 
B. How long have you been a pilot? 
□  0 – 3 years □  3 – 5 years □  5 – 10 years 
 
□  10 or more years □  Not Applicable 
Comments: 
C. How many hours of total time as a pilot do you have? 
□  0 - 100 □  100 – 500 □  500 – 1,500 
 
□  1,500 – 3,000 □  3,000 – or more  
Comments: 
D. How long have you been employed here? 
□  0 – 1 years □  1 – 3 years □  3 – 5 years 
 
□  5 or more years □  Not Applicable  (not employed here) 
Comments: 
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